Slack And Crash Risk by Goodman, Theodore et al.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2020 Volume 36, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 107 The Clute Institute 
 
Slack And Crash Risk 
Theodore Goodman, Purdue University, USA 
Volkan Muslu, University of Houston, USA 





We examine how a firm’s operational slack is associated with current income and future stock price crash risk. By 
doing so, we test the validity of a firm’s alternative motivations for holding operational slack. We show that Supply 
Chain Slack, which is based on excess working capital, is associated with higher current profits and higher future 
crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the firm hoarding bad news. In contrast, SG&A Slack, which is based on 
excess selling, general, and administrative expenses, is associated with lower current income and lower future crash 
risk. This evidence is consistent with the firm insuring against rare and adverse events. Furthermore, a firm’s stock 
price crash risk is lower when a slack type is more costly, consistent with both motivations. Overall, our findings 
suggest a stronger profit-crash risk tradeoff when firms hold more operational slack. 
 





perational slack is a firm’s resources that generate less value than typically expected. For instance, a firm 
can hold excess inventory, collect receivables late, and pay payables early. These working capital decisions 
tie up the firm’s resources, lengthen cash flow cycle, and thus, all else equal, reduce profits. Similarly, a 
firm can spend excessively on employee salaries, employee benefits, R&D, and advertising. These operating expenses 
mechanically reduce profits. The strategic management and operations management literatures have searched for 
potential benefits of operational slack (in the form of current and future profits) that counter the mechanical costs. Yet, 
the findings are mixed (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari & Turner, 2004; Modi & Mishra, 2011; Kovach, Hora, Manikas & 
Patel, 2015). 
  
If operational slack does not generate benefits to counter mechanical costs, how would a firm with operational slack 
thrive in the long run? We address this question by examining a firm’s future stock price crash risk, which are realized 
or expected large, negative, and discontinuous movements in a firm’s stock price.1 Note that we focus on a firm’s 
downside risk - not the firm’s valuation or upside potential - given that a firm’s long-term competitiveness depends 
on its downside risk. Moreover, investors conceptualize a firm’s risk by the downside risk despite the predominantly 
symmetric risk measures in the finance literature (Miller & Reuer, 1996; Jin & Myers, 2006). 
 
There are four explanations for why a firm holds operational slack. Each explanation predicts different outcomes in 
current profits and future stock price crash risk. First, under the premise of effective management, a firm can have 
operational slack to offset rare and adverse events such as disruptions in supply chain and inflation (insurance 
explanation). In this case, current profits should be lower because of the sub-optimal use of resources, and stock price 
crash risk should be lower as well (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Hendricks, Singhal & Zhang, 2009). Second, under the 
premise of ineffective management, a firm can have operational slack that does not maximize shareholder value (poor 
management explanation). In this case, current profits should be lower, and stock price crash risk should be higher. 
Third, under the premise of strong agency costs, a firm can have operational slack to defer reporting low profits (bad 
news hoarding explanation). For instance, the firm can delay impairment of inventory and receivables. In this case, 
current profits should be higher as intended, and stock price crash risk should be higher (Jin & Myers, 2006, Hutton, 
 
1 We measure stock price crash risk in two ways. The negative skewness of stock returns measures the frequency and severity of realized stock price 
crashes (Chen, Hong & Stein, 2001). The negative skewness of implied volatilities for traded options measures investors’ expectations of a future 
stock price crash (Kim, Li, Lu & Yu, 2016). 
O 
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Marcus & Tehranian, 2009). Finally, under the premise of effective management, a firm can have operational slack to 
accommodate current and expected growth (accommodating growth explanation). For instance, the firm can have high 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs (Anderson, Banker & Janakiraman, 2003) and hold high levels of 
inventory (Bernard & Noel, 1991; Sun, 2010). In this case, current profits should be higher, and stock price crash risk 
should be lower. 
 
We test the above explanations by using two major types of slack, which have different accounting treatments yet 
collectively capture a firm’s major operational decisions. Supply Chain Slack measures a firm’s excess cash flow cycle, 
which is determined by working capital decisions. Supply Chain Slack is capitalized and does not mechanically reduce 
current profits. SG&A Slack measures a firm’s excess SG&A expenses, which is determined by other operational 
decisions. SG&A Slack is immediately expensed.  
 
We find, on average, that a firm’s current profits and future crash risk both increase with Supply Chain Slack, consistent 
with the bad news hoarding explanation. In contrast, current profits and future crash risk both decrease with SG&A 
Slack, consistent with the insurance explanation. Furthermore, both slack types strengthen the typically positive 
association between a firm’s current profits and future stock crash risk. In other words, operational slack that reduces 
(does not reduce) current profits also reduces (does not reduce) stock price crashes. This is consistent with both the 
bad news hoarding and insurance explanations.  
 
Our study makes the following contributions. First, it helps us to understand the benefits of operational slack. The 
operations management and strategic management literatures have failed to document that operational slack 
universally improves current or future profits (Daniel et al. 2004; Kovach et al. 2015). This is likely because slack’s 
earnings-related benefits do not fully offset slack’s mechanical costs. Moreover, prior studies used different samples 
and slack definitions (Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998; Mishina, Pollock & Porac, 2004), hypothesized different timelines 
between operational slack and performance (Daniel et al. 2004), and ignored firms’ measurement errors as well as 
earnings management incentives. Our paper puts forward reduced stock price crashes as a potential benefit of slack, 
especially under conditions of low current profits. A slack that is associated with low profits is also associated with 
reduced stock price crashes, thereby contributing to firm’s long-run chances for survival. Our findings answer Daniel’s 
et al. (2004) call for additional research into intervening factors that impact the slack-performance relationship as well 
as George’s (2005, p. 672) call for future research “from the simple question of whether slack is good for performance 
to a more complex set of questions: How much and what form of slack is good for performance and when is slack 
good for performance?” 
 
Second, our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk. The findings in the 
literature primarily suggest bad news hoarding as the primary explanation for crash risk. Yet the studies have ignored 
operational slack as a potential determinant. We show that operational slack impacts a firm’s stock price crash risk in 
different ways. Profit-reducing slack decreases future crash risk (consistent with insurance explanation) while profit-
neutral and profit-increasing slack increases future crash risk (consistent with bad news hoarding explanation). This 
evidence also complements a recent finding by Francis, Hasan & Lingxian (2016) that crash risk increases with the 
extent a firm deviates real operations from industry norms, especially with the purpose of managing earnings upwards. 
 
Finally, our research contributes to the debate on how firms do (should) manage their risks. Bodnar, Graham, Harvey 
& Marston’s (2011) global survey finds that firms have been increasingly managing their risks through operational 
decisions such as holding slack. The financial crisis of 2008 elevated the issue of firm-specific risk management to 
the forefront from a public policy perspective. Thus, public policy makers can use our findings about the effectiveness 
of operational slack, particularly for firms that have a systemic role in the economy. 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses by linking different strands of 
literature about slack and crash risk. Section 3 describes research design. Section 4 presents sample selection and 
findings. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Operational Slack Definitions and Profits 
 
We compute two operational slack proxies. First, Supply Chain Slack measures the sub-optimal deployment of a firm’s 
working capital (Hendricks et al. 2009; Kovach et al. 2015). Supply Chain Slack is defined as Inventory Slack + 
Receivables Slack + Payables Slack. Inventory Slack is the level of inventory scaled by cost of goods sold (COGS). 
Receivables Slack is the level of trade receivables scaled by sales. Payables Slack is the level of trade payables scaled 
by COGS, multiplied by negative one. Inventory Slack, Receivables Slack, and Payables Slack interact and affect the 
operating cash cycle of a firm in similar ways. A higher Supply Chain Slack indicates a longer operating cash cycle, 
that is, a higher level of inventory and receivables, and a lower level of payables for a given level of sales. The second 
proxy SG&A Slack is defined as selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by sales revenue (Driouchi & 
Bennett, 2011). A higher SG&A Slack indicates high levels of investment in employees (e.g., higher staff salaries, 
pension), intangible assets (e.g., R&D and advertising), and other periodic costs (e.g., rental or depreciation costs). 
 
The direct effect of SG&A Slack on current profits is negative, because components of SG&A Slack are expensed. 
However, this effect could be offset by indirect benefits (e.g., higher sales revenues as a result of higher advertising 
expenses, higher productivity as a result of highly paid employees). In their meta-analysis of 66 prior studies, Daniel 
et al. (2004) find a positive - albeit weak - relation between SG&A Slack and current profits, consistent with potential 
benefits of holding SG&A Slack offsetting the mechanical costs.  
 
The effect of Supply Chain Slack on current profits is not as trivial, because components of Supply Chain Slack are 
not expensed. Empirically, excess working capital reduces asset turnover and current profits under a stable business 
environment (Modi & Mishra, 2011). Similarly, there is negative, yet concave, relation between inventory slack and 
profits (Eroglu & Hofer, 2011). At the same time, Supply Chain Slack can suggest a firm’s optimally addressing 
unexpected threats and opportunities and generating profit under an unstable business environment (Kovach et al. 
2015). Profits first increase with slack and then decrease with additional slack (George, 2005). In their meta-analysis, 
Daniel et al. (2004) find a positive relationship between working capital slack and current and future profits. Similarly, 
a strand of accounting research documents inconsistent findings. A high level of net operating assets, which reflects a 
high level of Supply Chain Slack, is associated with strong profits possibly due to earnings management, followed by 
weaker future profits (Fairfield, Whisenant & Yohn, 2003; Hirshleifer, Hou & Teoh, 2004).  
 
In addition to operational slack, companies also have investment and financial slack, such as excess cash balance, 
PP&E, and intangibles, financial debt, and potential for additional debt. We focus on operational slack while 
controlling for such financial and investment slack.  
 
2.2 Motivations for Holding Operational Slack 
 
While outsiders can observe operational slack from financial statements, they cannot observe managers’ motivations 
for holding operational slack. Below we provide four ways outsiders could explain managers’ motivation for holding 
operational slack, which have different implications on current profits and future crash price risk.  
 
2.3 Insurance Against Downside Risk 
 
The notion of downside risk appears across various streams of literature. In psychology, the prospect theory predicts 
and finds that individuals asymmetrically react to the prospect of losses (Kahneman et al. 1982). In finance, a downside 
risk model can explain stock returns better than the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model, which treats positive and 
negative return volatility symmetrically (Harlow & Rao, 1989; Ang et al. 2006). In strategic management literature, 
managers and financial analysts consider risk as the size and probability of losses rather than the size and possibility 
of positive outcomes (Baird & Thomas, 1990; Collins & Ruefli, 1992; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Porter (1985, p. 476) 
states: “Risk is a function of how poorly a strategy will perform if the “wrong” scenario occurs.”  
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Under the premise of effective management, operational slack can reduce the frequency and cost of an adverse event. 
For instance, operational slack helps to mitigate the adverse stock price reaction to supply chain disruptions (Hendricks 
et al. 2009). Excess credit to customers helps firms to establish a long-term relationship with customers (Wilner, 2000; 
Cunat, 2007). A low level of payables helps to develop favorable relations with suppliers and improve terms of 
borrowing with creditors. Firms can have high personnel costs due to meticulous internal controls (e.g., more 
employees tasked with oversight), which mitigate adverse events. High salaries and pensions can help retain talent 
and reduce employee turnover. High R&D and advertising expenses help to develop high-quality products and 
maintain customer loyalty, thereby mitigating operational risks. In addition, firms can cut some of these costs to meet 
profit targets and preserve liquidity when they face rare and adverse conditions (Bushee, 1998; Cohen, Mashruwala 
& Zach, 2010; Kovach et al. 2015). Overall, a firm will have both low current profits and low future crash risk when 
it uses operational slack for insurance purposes. 
 
2.4 Poor Management 
 
Under the premise of ineffective management, managers cannot assess optimal slack levels while attempting to 
maximize share value. For instance, firms that hold high levels of inventory to insulate from supply chain disruptions 
may reduce immediate risks to inventory shortage but give rise to the risk of inventory obsolescence. Under the 
wasteful spending view of poor management, managers hold slack to benefit their vested interests despite little to no 
benefit to shareholders (John, Li & Pang, 2017). For instance, firms with overly compensated employees and non-
optimal advertising and R&D expenses may not be insulated from adverse shocks. In either case, the poor management 
explanation suggests that poor management of risk (Kovach et al. 2015). Overall, a firm will have low current profits 
and high future crash risk when operational slack results from poor management. 
 
2.5 Bad News Hoarding 
 
Under the premise of agency costs, managers can conceal bad news and avoid recording expenses for an extended 
period. For example, high levels of inventory and receivables may indicate inability to sell inventory and collect 
receivables combined with managers’ reluctance to write off inventory and receivables. In this case, Supply Chain 
Slack indicates bloated balance sheet due to a history of bad news hoarding (Hirshleifer et al. 2004). When bad news 
cannot be held anymore, stock prices crash (Jin & Myers, 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Zhu, 2016). Overall, a firm will 
have both high current profits and high future crash risk when it hoards bad news. This explanation is valid only for 
Supply Chain Slack. In contrast, SG&A Slack indicates immediate recording of expenses and less likelihood of 
hoarding bad news. 
 
2.6 Accommodating Growth  
 
Under the premise of effective management, managers realizing or expecting high growth hold more working capital 
and recognize higher SG&A expense (Anderson et al. 2003). Similarly, increases in inventory-to-sales ratio may 
indicate managers’ optimistic expectations on sales and profits (Bernard & Noel, 1991; Sun, 2010). Moreover, 
managers’ growth expectations are accurate for a large proportion of firms (Anderson, Banker, Huang & Janakiraman, 
2007). Overall, a firm will have high current profits and low future crash risk when it uses operational slack to 
accommodate growth. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 The Relation between Slack and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
We estimate the following regression model to examine the relation between operational slack and stock price crash 
risk: 
 
𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑦&'( = 𝛿(𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤& + 𝛿-𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘& + ΦControl	Variables& + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜔& (1a) 
 
𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤& = 𝛿(𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤&L( + 𝛿-𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘& + ΦControlVariables& + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜔& (1b) 
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Equation (1a) estimates the determinants of an ex-post measure of crash risk.  NSkewt+1 is the skewness of the firm’s 
weekly stock returns during year t+1, multiplied by negative one. The literature defines stock price crash risk using 
idiosyncratic returns (Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011a; Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011b). While our findings are robust to this 
definition, we define crash risk using raw returns to avoid confounding effects of return prediction models.  
 
Equation (1b) estimates the determinants of an ex-ante measure crash risk. Expectations of stock price crashes are as 
important to capital markets as realized crashes. Kim et al. (2016) argue that investors “demand a much larger risk 
premium for expected crash risk than for historical crash risk.” Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) find historically large 
equity and variance risk premia for jump tail risk, especially left tail (disaster or fear risk). Consistent with finance 
literature (Dumas, Fleming & Whaley, 1998; Bollen & Whaley, 2004; Kim, Li, Lu & Yu, 2016), we use option smirk 
curve or implied volatility skewness as the proxy for ex ante crash risk. Specifically, IVSkewt is the weighted average 
of daily differences between implied stock return volatilities of out-of-the-money put options and at-the-money call 
options over the 12 months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t.  
 
Equations (1a) and (1b) include lagged crash risk, slack, current profits, and control variables. The lagged crash risk 
proxies (i.e., NSkewt, and IVSkewt-1) control for persistent firm characteristics. We use the following financial control 
variables:  
 
ROE = Net income divided by shareholder's equity, 
Loss = Indicator that is one if income before extraordinary items is negative, 
Return = Annual raw stock returns, 
Firm Efficiency = Demerjian, Lev & McVay’s (2012) measure of total firm efficiency, measuring a firm’s 
ability in transforming resources to revenue, 
Managerial Ability = Demerjian et al.’s (2012) measure of managerial ability, which is the residual firm efficiency 
that cannot be explained by firm-specific variables,  
Log(Assets) = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
Number of Analysts = The number of analysts making stock recommendations on the firm, 
B/M = Book value of total assets divided by market value of total assets, 
Return Volatility = Standard deviation of weekly stock returns, 
Trading Volume = Annual trading volume divided by the average number of shares outstanding, 
Beta = Coefficient estimate for industry return, obtained from firm and year-specific regressions of 
a firm’s weekly returns on SIC 2-digit industry returns, negative industry return indicator, 
and interaction of industry returns and negative industry return indicator (See A1 in the 
Appendix), 
Age = The number of years since the firm’s stock appeared in the CRSP/Compustat database (1980 
is the starting year), 
Accruals = Change in net operating assets, computed as total assets (at)-cash and short-term 
investments (che)-total liabilities (lt)+debt in current liabilities (dlc)+long-term debt (dltt) 
in the CRSP/Compustat database, 
Cash = Cash and short-term investments (che) divided by total assets, 
LR ETR = Long-run effective tax rate, computed as the sum of income tax paid (txpd) over the previous 
five years divided by the sum of a firm's pre-tax income minus special items (pi - spi) 
(Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008). When the special item is missing, it is set to zero. LR 
ETR is winsorized at 0 and 1, 
Auditor Tenure = The number of years the incumbent auditor has been auditing the firm (Callen & Fang, 
2017). 
 
All regression variables except for year fixed effects and indicator variables are ranked to vary between zero and one 
within a firm’s SIC 2-digit industry. This ranking mitigates the effect of outliers and controls for unobservable industry 
characteristics that affect crash risk and slack (Daniel et al. 2004; Wefald, Katz, Downey & Rust, 2010). The control 
variables include potential determinants of slack. Including these variables in the same models as slack amounts to 
running a first-stage model to determine excess slack based on these variables and then using excess slack in the 
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second-stage model to predict crash risk. We chose a single-step approach to be transparent on the use of our control 
variables and the incremental impact of operational slack on crash risk.  
 
3.2 Conditioning on Firm Profitability 
 




  Association between Operational Slack and Future Crash 
Risk 
  Positive Negative 
Association between Operational 
Slack and Current Profits 
Positive  Bad News Hoarding Accommodating Growth 
Negative Poor Management Insurance 
 
 
Overall, the prediction for operational slack and future crash risk depends on the assumption about slack and current 
profit. The insurance and bad news hoarding explanations predict a trade-off between current profit and future crash 
risk, where operational slack has similar correlations with current profit and future crash risk. In contrast, the poor 
management and accommodating growth explanations predict that operational slack has opposite correlations with 
current profit and future crash risk.  
 
We devise cross-sectional tests based on current profits in order to examine the empirical validity of these explanations. 
For example, we can distinguish between the insurance and poor management explanations by examining the effect 
of slack on future crash risk when current profits are low. According to the insurance explanation, low profits reflect 
costly risk management activities and thus low future crash risk. According to the poor management explanation, low 
profits reflect inefficiencies and thus high future crash risk. We allow the association between slack and stock price 
crash risk to vary with accounting profits by including interaction variables into Equations (1a) and (1b). This results 
in the following model: 
 
𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤&'(	𝑜𝑟	𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤& = 𝛿((𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤&	𝑜𝑟	𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤&L() + 𝛿-𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘& + 𝛿P𝑅𝑂𝐸& + 𝛿S𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘& ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸& + 
ΦVariables& + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜔&  (2) 
 
The interaction term 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘&*𝑅𝑂𝐸& allows the effect of slack to change with profits. 𝑅𝑂𝐸& remains as a control variable. 
 
The insurance and bad news hoarding explanations separately predict a positive coefficient on the interaction term. 
First, operational slack is more likely to increase future crash risk when profit is high due to bad news hoarding. 
Second, operational slack is more likely to decrease future crash risk when profit is low due to insurance activities. In 
contrast, the poor management and accommodating growth explanations separately predict a negative coefficient on 
the interaction term. First, operational slack is more likely to increase future crash risk when current profit is poor due 
to poor management. Second, operational slack is more likely to decrease crash risk when current profit is high due 
to growth expectations. 
 




Our sample consists of firms in the CRSP/Compustat database for years between 1990 and 2013. We remove financial 
firms given that operational slack is trivial in the finance industry. In order to avoid small denominator problems, we 
remove firms with assets, sales, shareholders' equity, and COGS smaller than $1 million. We also remove observations 
with missing crash risk proxies, slack types, and financial control variables. Our final sample includes 71,018 firm-
year observations. 
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4.2 The Relation between Operational Slack and Negative Skewness of Stock Returns 
 
For the ensuing tests, we rank all variables to vary between 0 and 1 within SIC 2-digit industry groups for two reasons. 
First, industry membership shapes a firm’s slack policies and crash risk, and failure to adequately control for industry 
effects may result in false inferences. Second, the ranking mitigates the effect of outliers. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of Equation (1a), where the dependent variable is NSkewt+1. Column 1 shows that Supply 
Chain Slackt is positively associated with NSkewt+1, consistent with excess working capital accounts signaling or 
amplifying one-year-ahead crashes. The overall evidence is consistent with the bad news hoarding explanation, given 
that Supply Chain Slack does not decrease current profits and could in fact represent a history of upward earnings 
management (e.g., Hirshleifer et al. 2004). Column 2 shows that SG&A Slackt is negatively associated with NSkewt+1.  
The overall evidence is consistent with the insurance explanation, given the negative association between SG&A Slack 
and current profits. When both slack types are included in Column 3, the coefficient magnitudes and significances 
remain. In terms of economic significance, moving Supply Chain Slackt from the lower to the higher half of its 
distribution increases NSkewt+1 by (0.015*50% =) 0.008 or 2.8% of standard deviation of NSkewt+1, whereas moving 
SG&A Slackt from the lower to the higher half of its distribution decreases NSkewt+1 by (0.031*50% =) 0.017 or 5.8% 
of standard deviation of NSkewt+1. 
 
We perform several sensitivity tests. First, we replace NSkewt+1with NSkewt+1, t+2, which uses weekly stock returns 
from years t+1 and t+2. When we re-estimate Eq. (1) using NSkewt+1, t+2 as the dependent variable (Column 4), the 
coefficient estimates for Supply Chain Slackt and SG&A Slackt are weaker but statistically significant. Second, we 
replace NSkewt+1 with DNSkewt+1, which uses daily stock returns from year t+1. When we re-estimate Eq. (1) using 
DNSkewt+1 as the dependent variable (Column 5), the coefficient estimates for Supply Chain Slackt and SG&A Slackt 
are significant. Third, in untabulated tests we use raw values of all variables in Eq. (1) and find that the signs and 
economic significance of coefficient estimates for Supply Chain Slackt and SG&A Slackt remain consistent.  
 
The coefficients for control variables are consistent with the expectations and past findings. NSkewt+1 is higher when 
1) firms have higher NSkewt, 2) they had higher profits and did not report accounting losses, 3) they had higher stock 
returns, 4) they were larger, 5) they were followed by more analysts, 6) they had high growth expectations (low B/M 
ratio), 7) they had low stock return volatility and high trading volume, 8) they had low betas, or 9) they had higher 
effective tax rates (Kim et al. 2011a). NSkewt+1 is not significantly related with 1) variables that measure firm 
efficiency and managerial ability in transforming resources to sales (Demerjian et al. 2012), 2) company age, 3) accrual 
levels (Zhu, 2016), 4) cash balances, or 5) auditor tenure (Callen & Fang, 2017). One inconsistency between our 
findings and the literature is that Return Volatilityt and Betat are negative in our tests while they are positive and 
significant (Kim et al. 2011a, p. 650; Kim et al. 2011b, p. 721) or insignificant (Zhu, 2016, p. 336) in prior studies. 
This inconsistency likely arises because of strong correlations among Return Volatilityt, Betat, and NSkewt+1 in our 
sample. 
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Table 1. The Relation between Slack and Negative Skewness of Stock Returns 
 NSkewt+1 NSkewt+1 NSkewt+1 NSkewt+1, t+2 DNSkewt+1 
NSkewt 
0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.486*** 0.081*** 
(15.15) (15.04) (14.96) (144.94) (18.85) 
Supply Chain Slackt 
0.010***  0.015*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 
(2.83)  (3.93) (3.14) (3.88) 
SG&A Slackt  
-0.028*** -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.034*** 
 (-6.52) (-7.04) (-4.95) (-7.56) 
ROEt 
0.021*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.006 0.023*** 
(3.31) (2.26) (2.37) (1.20) (3.56) 
Losst 
-0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.006** -0.020*** 
(-4.68) (-4.51) (-4.26) (-2.04) (-5.40) 
Returnt 
0.108*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.159*** 0.113*** 
(24.17) (23.53) (23.42) (42.04) (24.86) 
Firm Efficiencyt 
0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.013** 0.006 
(0.64) (0.07) (-0.04) (2.38) (0.86) 
Managerial Abilityt  
0.009* 0.008 0.008 -0.009** 0.008 
(1.79) (1.61) (1.61) (-2.11) (1.46) 
Log (Assets)t 
0.152*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 
(23.12) (22.47) (22.71) (20.22) (17.65) 
Number of Analystst 
0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.025*** 
(4.64) (4.76) (4.72) (0.98) (4.88) 
B/Mt -0.077
*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.063*** -0.085*** 
(-16.20) (-17.21) (-17.40) (-15.99) (-17.09) 
Return Volatilityt 
-0.089*** -0.090*** -0.089*** 0.000 -0.074*** 
(-14.54) (-14.60) (-14.48) (0.06) (-11.91) 
Trading Volumet 
0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.029*** 0.069*** 
(16.21) (16.35) (16.28) (7.34) (14.29) 
Betat 
-0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.036*** -0.045*** 
(-27.64) (-27.81) (-27.79) (-11.59) (-11.69) 
Aget 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.011*** 0.002 
(-0.44) (-0.34) (-0.52) (2.86) (0.52) 
Accrualst 
0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.005 
(0.68) (1.06) (0.95) (-1.21) (1.35) 
Casht 
-0.010** -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 
(-2.45) (-1.16) (-0.70) (-1.05) (-1.34) 
LR ETRt 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.007** 0.022*** 
(4.28) (4.23) (3.86) (2.11) (5.28) 
Auditor Tenuret 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
(-1.63) (-1.45) (-1.41) (-1.24) (-1.08) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,018 71,018 71,018 70,953 71,018 
Adjusted R2 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 38.0% 13.8% 
 
 
4.3 The Relation between Operational Slack and Expected Crash Risk 
 
Table 2 presents the results of Equation (1b), where dependent variable is IVSkewt. The sample is smaller due to the 
requirement for actively traded options (N=25,503 versus 71,018). Across columns, we find that the coefficients for 
SG&A Slackt are consistently negative and significant. That is, investors expect that SG&A Slack mitigates future 
crashes. Similar to Panel A, this finding is consistent with investors viewing SG&A Slack as arising from an insurance 
motivation. The coefficient for Supply Chain Slack is positive and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. 
Similar to Panel A, this finding is consistent with investors viewing Supply Chain Slack as arising due to bad news 
hoarding. When we use raw variables, the signs of coefficient estimates for both slack types are significant. 
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Table 2. Slack and Expected Stock Price Crash Risk 
 IVSkewt IVSkewt IVSkewt IVSkewt, t+1 
IVSkewt-1 
0.345*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.288*** 
(46.03) (45.88) (45.86) (36.03) 
Supply Chain Slackt 
0.007  0.010* 0.011 
(1.25)  (1.82) (1.61) 
SG&A Slackt  
-0.028*** -0.029*** -0.036*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.74) (-4.70) 
ROEt 
-0.040*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.049*** 
(-4.41) (-5.05) (-4.97) (-4.80) 
Losst 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012** 
(-1.03) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-1.97) 
Returnt 
0.054*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.026*** 
(7.68) (7.22) (7.20) (3.81) 
Firm Efficiencyt 
0.016 0.011 0.011 0.006 
(1.61) (1.10) (1.09) (0.45) 
Managerial Abilityt  
-0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 
(-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.97) (-0.10) 
Log (Assets)t 
0.020 0.017 0.018 0.018 
(1.61) (1.34) (1.44) (1.16) 
Number of Analystst 
-0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.015* 
(-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.87) 
B/Mt -0.009 -0.017
** -0.017** -0.019** 
(-1.17) (-2.13) (-2.14) (-2.00) 
Return Volatilityt 
0.178*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.192*** 
(17.26) (17.21) (17.23) (16.43) 
Trading Volumet 
-0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.025** 
(-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.38) (-2.35) 
Betat 
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.015** 
(0.70) (0.60) (0.61) (2.22) 
Aget 
-0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.013 
(-2.85) (-2.72) (-2.80) (-1.60) 
Accrualst 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 
(-1.34) (-1.08) (-1.13) (-0.58) 
Casht 
-0.019*** -0.014** -0.013** -0.019** 
(-3.05) (-2.18) (-1.97) (-2.38) 
LR ETRt 
0.008 0.007 0.006 0.010 
(1.26) (1.12) (0.95) (1.23) 
Auditor Tenuret 
-0.011* -0.010* -0.010* -0.017** 
(-1.95) (-1.81) (-1.77) (-2.48) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,503 25,503 25,503 25,719 
Adjusted R2 36.4% 36.5% 36.5% 33.7% 
 
 
In terms of economic significance, moving Supply Chain Slackt from the lower to the higher half of its distribution 
increases IVSkewt by (0.010*50% =) 0.005 or 1.8% of standard deviation of IVSkewt, whereas moving SG&A Slackt 
from the lower to the higher half of its distribution decreases IVSkewt  by (0.029*50% =) 0.015 or 5.1% of standard 
deviation of IVSkewt. 
 
4.4 The Relation between Costly Slack and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
Equation (2) allows for the relation between slack types and crash risk proxies to vary with ROEt. We use ROE as our 
measure of the cost of slack, because ROEt is a common key factor in a firm’s equity value (Barth et al. 1998; Hung 
2000). The interaction term indicates whether the effect of a slack type is similar across firms with different levels of 
ROEt and help us differentiate between the validity of the alternative explanations in Section 2.   
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Table 3 presents results of Eq. (2) when the dependent variable is NSkewt+1 (Columns 1 and 2) and IVSkewt (Columns 
3 and 4). The two slack types are interacted with ROEt separately across columns. When the dependent variable is 
NSkewt+1, we find positive and marginally significant coefficients on ROEt’s interactions with Supply Chain Slack and 
SG&A Slack. the dependent variable is IVSkewt, we find positive and statistically significant coefficients on ROEt’s 
interaction with SG&A Slack. However, ROEt’s interaction with Supply Chain Slack is insignificant. Similar 
untabulated findings are obtained when we exclude loss firms, use unranked variables, or use Negative Tail Riskt+1 as 
the dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 3. Costly Slack and Crash Risk 
 Dependent variable = NSkewt+1 Dependent variable = IVSkewt 
Supply Chain Slackt 
0.000  0.011  
(0.01)  (0.85)  
SG&A Slackt 
 -0.039***  -0.064*** 
 (-5.05)  (-4.75) 
ROEt  
0.012 0.005 -0.037*** -0.076*** 
(1.35) (0.51) (-2.95) (-5.90) 
Supply Chain Slackt* 
ROEt 
0.021*  -0.008  
(1.74)  (-0.40)  
SG&A Slackt* ROEt 
 0.022*  0.066*** 
 (1.69)  (3.30) 
Lagged dependent 
variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,018 71,018 25,503 25,503 
Adjusted R2 16.7% 16.7% 36.6% 36.6% 
 
 
Table 3 presents results of Eq. (2) when the dependent variable is NSkewt+1 (Columns 1 and 2) and IVSkewt (Columns 
3 and 4). The two slack types are interacted with ROEt separately across columns. When the dependent variable is 
NSkewt+1, we find positive and marginally significant coefficients on ROEt’s interactions with Supply Chain Slack and 
SG&A Slack. the dependent variable is IVSkewt, we find positive and statistically significant coefficients on ROEt’s 
interaction with SG&A Slack. However, ROEt’s interaction with Supply Chain Slack is insignificant. Similar 
untabulated findings are obtained when we exclude loss firms, use unranked variables, or use Negative Tail Riskt+1 as 
the dependent variable. 
 
Overall, these findings support our prediction that the implications of operational slack for future crash risk depend 
on the effect of that slack on current profits. Consistent with the insurance explanation, SG&A Slack is more likely to 
decrease realized and expected crash risk when current profits are low (i.e., when there is a cost associated with 
obtaining the insurance). In addition, consistent with the bad news hoarding explanation, Supply Chain Slack is more 





Operational slack decisions involve a firm’s idling or underusing resources for various reasons (Chopra & Sodhi, 
2004; Tang, 2006). These decisions have become an important part of corporate strategy after the global financial 
crisis of 2008 (Bodnar et al. 2011; State Street Advisors, 2013). In this paper, we test the validity of a firm’s alternative 
motivations for holding operational slack by examining the relations between different types of operational slack, 
current profits, and future stock price crash risk. We find that SG&A Slack is associated with lower current profits and 
lower future crash risk, consistent with the insurance motivation. Furthermore, Supply Chain Slack is associated with 
higher current profits and higher future crash risk, consistent with the bad news hoarding motivation. Our evidence 
does not extend support for the poor management and accommodating growth motivations. Finally, we find that both 
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SG&A Slack and Supply Chain Slack are associated with higher (lower) future crash risk when the firm reports higher 
(lower) profits. Overall, the findings suggest an overarching trade-off between current profits and future crash risk, 
which is stronger when companies have operational slack.  
 
Our findings contribute to multiple literatures. First, we reveal conditions where operational slack is more or less 
likely to reflect earnings management (i.e., a bad news hoarding motivation versus an insurance motivation) and thus 
benefit the firm by mitigating future crashes. Second, we contribute to the crash risk literature by documenting a novel 
determinant of crash risk, i.e., operational slack. Finally, we contribute to the risk management literature by 
highlighting the trade-off between costs and benefits of different types of operational slack. Our results are relevant 
to both external users of firm financials (investors and policy makers), who use financial ratios to assess corporate risk 
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Change in net operating assets, computed as total assets (at) - cash and short-term investments (che) - 
total liabilities (lt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt), deflated by total assets. The 
data is obtained from the CRSP/Compustat database. 
Age  
The number of years since the firm’s stock appeared in the CRSP/Compustat database (1980 is the 
starting year). 
Auditor Tenure The number of years the incumbent auditor has been auditing the firm (Source: Audit Analytics) (Callen & Fang, 2017). 
B/M Book value of total assets divided by market value of total assets. 
Beta 
The firm’s industry slope coefficient, defined as β1 in the following firm-year-specific regression 
below: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡U,W = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑒𝑡Z,W + 𝛽-𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑡Z,\ + 𝛽P𝑅𝑒𝑡Z,W ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑡Z,W + 𝜀U,W (A1) 
 
where Retf, w is weekly return of firm f, Reti, w is average weekly return of SIC 2-digit industry i that 
firm f belongs to, and NegReti, w is an indicator that is one if Reti, w is negative. 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. 
DNSkew Skewness coefficient of the firm's daily stock returns multiplied by (-1). 
Firm Efficiency 
Demerjian et al.’s (2012) measure of total firm efficiency, measuring the firm’s ability in transforming 
corporate resources to revenue. The data is obtained from Sarah McVay’s research website  
(Source: http://faculty.washington.edu/smcvay/abilitydata.html). 
Hedge Activity Indicator that is one if the firm reported non-zero hedging gains and losses. 
IV_Skew 
Weighted average of daily differences between implied stock return volatilities of out-of-the-money 
put options and at-the-money call options over the 12 months ending three months after the end of 
fiscal year. 
Log(Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Loss Indicator that is one if income before extraordinary items is negative. 
LR ETR 
Long-run effective tax rate is computed as the sum of income tax paid (txpd) over the previous five 
years divided by the sum of a firm's pre-tax income minus special items (pi - spi) (Dyreng et al. 2008). 
Missing special items are set to zero. LR ETR is winsorized at 0 and 1. 
Managerial Ability Demerjian et al.’s (2012) measure of managerial ability, which is the residual firm efficiency that cannot be explained by firm-specific variables. 
Negative Special Items Indicator that is one if special items is negative. 
Number of Analysts The number of analysts making stock recommendations on the firm.  
NSkew Skewness coefficient of the firm’s weekly stock returns multiplied by (-1). 
Return  Annual raw stock returns. 
Return Volatility  Standard deviation of weekly stock returns. 
ROE  Net income divided by shareholder’s equity. 
SG&A Slack SG&A expense divided by sales revenue. 
Supply Chain Slack 
Length of the operating cash cycle, measured as total inventory divided by cost of goods sold (Inventory 
Slack), plus total receivables divided by sales revenue (Receivables Slack), minus accounts payable 
divided by cost of goods sold (Payables Slack). 
Trading Volume  Annual trading volume divided by the average number of shares outstanding. 
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